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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
ERSELL HARRIS, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
SAMUEL W. SMITH, Warden, Utah 
State Prison, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
0 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant appeals from an order of the Third Judi-
cial District Court, the Honorable Pfcter F. Leary, pre-
siding, denying appellant's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Appellant filed an original petition on March 7, 1974, 
Case No. 
13859 
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and an amended petition on July 10, 1974, seeking re-
lease from the Utah State Prison. The Court heard argu-
ments and representations of counsel at a hearing held 
on August 29, 1974. On August 30, 1974, the Honorable 
Peter F. Leary ruled appellant's petition and amended 
petition for writ of habeas corpus was without merit 
and should be dismissed with prejudice. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the order denying 
appellant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The appellant is presently an inmate who is being 
held in the custody ol the respondent at the Utah State 
Prison pursuant to a judgment of conviction of the crime 
of forging a check in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-
26-1 (1953) (R. 53). 
In 1967 appellant was initially charged with the 
crime of uttering a fictitious check in violation of Utah 
Ann. § 76-26-7 (1953). On the motion of respondent's 
counsel, Mr. Barney, the original charge was dropped 
and a substitute charge of forging and uttering a check 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-26-1 (1953), was 
prosecuted (R. 54). On September 28 and 29, 1970, the 
appellant was tried by a jury and was found guilty of the 
offense charged. Pursuant to the judgment, the Honor-
able Merrill C. Faux of the Third District Court for 
Salt Lake County, sentenced the appellant to serve an 
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indeterminate term of one to twenty years. The con-
viction was subsequently sustained by the Supreme 
Court of the State of Utah on January 7, 1974 (R. 54). 
See State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P. 2d 1313 
(1974). Imposition of the prior sentence was ordered on 
February 11, 1974, shortly after the judgment of con-
viction was affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COMPLAINT WAS SUFFICIENT TO 
INVOKE THE JURISDICTION OF THE 
COURT AND PROVIDE THE APPELLANT 
WITH NOTICE OF THE OFFENSE WITH 
WHICH HE WAS CHARGED. 
The appellant alleges on this appeal that the com-
plaint was insufficient and did not provide him with 
adequate notice of the offense with which he was charged. 
In sum, he contends that the complaint was invalid and 
unable to invoke the jurisdiction of the count. 
The long-standing rule regarding the sufidency of 
the complaint to invoke a court's jurisdiction was stated 
in Batley v. Ritchie, 73 Utah 320, 273 Pac. 969 (1928), 
as follows: 
"The test of sufficiency, however, of an accu-
sation for the purpose of invoking jurisdiction, 
is not the test to which such pleading is sub-
jected when attacked by motion or demurrer. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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"Where it is clear that an attempt has been 
made to charge an offense of a kind over which 
the court has jurisdiction the accusation is suffi-
cient to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. 29 
C. J, 41. The inq[uiry in such case is not whether 
there is in the accusation such specific allega-
tions of the details of the charge as would make 
it good on demurrer,, but whether it describes 
a class of offenses of which the court has juris-
diction and alleges the defendant to be guilty." 
273 Pac. at 971. 
Additional support is found for this test in State 
v. Pay, 45 Utah 411, 146 P&c. 300 (1951), wherein the 
court held as follows: 
". . . the offense need not be stated in tech-
nical language, nor in such specific terms as is 
required by an iiiformation or an indictment. It 
is sufficient that the jurisdictional facts appear 
and that the crime is stated in ordinary lan-
guage. The language need not even be concise 
or without repetition. The only test is: Are all 
the elements constituting the offense stated?" 
146 Pac. at 305. 
See also State v. Colston, 16 Utah 2d 89, 396 P. 2d 405 
(1964); State v. Scow, 101 Utah 564, 125 P. 2d 954 
(1942); and State v. Burke, 102 Utah 249, 129 P. 2d 560 
(1942). 
The complaint in dispute stated the general name of 
the crime charged, the title, chapter, and section of the 
crime in the Code and described the alleged acts of the 
plaintiff which constituted the crime. There can be little 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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doubt that such detail more than satisfies the test of 
describing a class of offenses of which the lower court 
had jurisdiction. The complaint presently under review 
satisfies all six of the statutory elements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-11-1 (1953), with regard to the contents of a 
complaint. 
Appellant's own counsel recognized the weakness of 
this argument when he admitted that "citing the title 
of forgery and the section is sufficient for a complaint" 
(R. 71). 
In support of appellant's argument, he cites State 
v. Jensen, 103 Utah 478, 136 P. 2d 949 (1943). The 
Jensen case articulates the difference between a fictitious 
and a forged instrument. The requisite elements for each 
offense are reviewed in detail. The central issue of the 
case was whether defendant was given a preliminary 
hearing on the offense for which she was charged. Al-
though the issues in the case at hand are different from 
those of Jensen, the dictum of the case supports the 
respondent's proposition that the appellant was properly 
charged and that the lower court had jurisdiction over 
the controversy. 
Secondly, the complaint clearly gives the appellant 
adequate notice of the offense with which he was charged. 
The language of the complaint fully apprised the appel-
lant of the precise charge that the State had filed against 
him. See State v. Colston, supra. However, specific terms 
or technical language as may be required by an informa-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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tion or an indictment, are not essential elements of a 
complaint. See State v. Pay, supra. 
It is clear from the aforementioned case law that 
a complaint need only satisfy the notice requirements 
of Utah Code Ann. § 77-11-1 (1953). A complaint is not 
an information or an indictment therefore it need not 
comply with Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-8 (1953). See 
State v. Pay, supra. However, the point need not be 
argued as the complaint filed against the appellant 
clearly satisfies subsection (a) of Utah Code Ann. § 
77-21-8 (1953). 
In sum, there appears to be no basis or merit to 
appellant's claims that the complaint was invalid and 
insufficient on its face. The complaint under considera-
tion satisfies the aforementioned case law and statutory 
standards. Further, appellant's own counsel even ad-
mitted to weakness of the argument (R. 71). 
POINT II. 
APPELLANT'S CONVICTION AND SEN-
TENCE BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
AFFIRMED BY THE UTAH STATE SU-
PREME COURT AND THE TRIAL COURT 
JUDGMENT WAS THEREAFTER PROP-
ERLY ENFORCED AGAINST THE APPEL-
LANT. 
The appellant was convicted of forgery before the 
Honorable Merrill C. Faux, in Third District Court on 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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September 29, 1970. He was sentenced to serve an in-
determinate term of one to twenty years as provided 
by law. Appellant's conviction was still on appeal on 
the effective date of the new criminal code. Thereafter, 
the Supreme Court of the State of Utah affirmed his 
conviction in State v. Harris, 30 Utah 2d 354, 517 P. 2d 
1313 (1974). 
The Utah Code of Criminal Procedure requires the 
enforcement of an affirmed judgment in Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-42-5 (1953). "If a judgment against the defendant 
is affirmed, the original judgment must be enfotrced." 
On February 11, 1974, the trial court through the 
Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, merely enforced its in-
determinate sentence which was previously diirected 
against the plaintiff. Therefore, there was in fact no re-
sentencing, as the appellant's trial court sentence was 
summarily enforced by virtue of Utah Code Ann. § 77-
42-5, supra, when the trial court's judgment and sentence 
was affirmed by the Utah State Supreme Court. 
The available case law uniformly supports the above 
conclusion. In People v. Sweeney, 55 C. 2d 27, 9 Gal. 
Rpitr. 793, 357 P. 2d 1049 (1960), the court held on the 
basis of a statute which was identical to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-42-5, supra, as follows: 
"The judgment is the sentence and appeal-
ing from both is tautological. The affirmance 
of the judgment carries with it the affirmance 
of the sentence." 357 P. 2d at 1052. 
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The trial court, through the Honorable Peter F. 
Leary, renewed the merits of this petition and similarly 
held that appellant's contention was without merit (R. 
49): 
"The Court finds that pursuant to Section 
77-42-5, Utah Code Annotated (1953) upon af-
firmance of a judgment by the appellate Court, 
the trial Court niust enforce the original judg-
ment (sentence) and must make all orders nec-
essary to carry it into effect. The Court further 
finds that the trial Court is without jurisdiction 
to alter, amend, modify or vacate said judgment. 
(People v. Maggio, 274 P. 611.)" 
It therefore appears that appellant's argument is 
without merit. The trial court acted properly in sum-
marily enforcing the judgment and sentence against ap-
pellant when his conviction and sentence was affirmed 
by the Supreme Court of the State of Utah. 
Appellant also contends that he is entitled to be 
resentenced in accxmiance with the provisions of the 
more recent Utah Criminal Code. The contention, how-
ever, its unfounded in the face of a savings clause in the 
new code. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103(2) (1953), states: 
"Any offense committed prior to the effec-
tive date of this code shall be governed by the 
law, statutory and non-statutory, existing at 
the time of commission thereof, except that a 
defense or limitation on punishment available 
under this code shall be available to any defen-
dant tried or retried after the effective date. An 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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offense under the laws of this state shall be 
deemed to have been committed prior to the 
effective date of this act if any of the elements 
of the offense occurred prior thereto." 
Utah case law in State v. Miller, 24 Utah 2d 1, 464 
P. 2d 844 (1970), has construed a savings clause similar 
to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103(2) (1953). The court in 
Miller held that the savings clause preserved the former 
punishment and that the accused was not enftitled to 
have his case reotnanded for sentencing in accordance with 
the new statutory penalties. Such a position is well es-
tablished in Utah jurisprudence as demonstrated by 
People v. Sloan, 2 Utah 326 (1877). 
The effective date of the new Utah Criminal Code 
is July 1, 1973, as provided in Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
102 (1953). The appellant was charged with o)mmittiing 
the crime of forgery on or about July 22, 1967. There-
fore, Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-102 and 103(2) clearly 
preclude the application of the new code provisions to 
the appellant's case. 
The trial court's decision is in agreement with the 
respondent's argument (R. 48). Based on State v. Tapp, 
26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P. 2d 334 (1971), the court held that 
since appellant was "tried, convicted and sentenced prior 
to the enactment and effective dates of said sections 
(Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-401 and 402 and 76-6-501(4) 
(1953)), he is subject to the provisions of the law in 
effect at the time of his trial and judgment." 
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POINT III. 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT CONSIDER 
ISSUES THAT WERE NOT RAISED OR AD-
JUDICATED IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
Appellant contends in Ptoint III of his brief that the 
new savings clause operates as a denial of equal protec-
tion of the law. A careful review of the lower court 
record indicates that the appellant failed to raise this 
issue in any pleading, memorandum, or oral presenta-
tion made to the court below. 
Utah case law uniformly holds that a party may not 
raise an issue on appeal that was not initially presented 
to ihe trial court. This Court in Evans v. Stand, 74 Utah 
451, 280 Pac. 239 (1929), concisely articulated the rule 
as follows: 
"The rule is well settled that on an appeal 
the parties are restricted to the theory on which 
the case was prosecuted or defended in the court 
below." 280 Pac. at 240. 
See also Twenty-Second Corp. v. Oregon Short Line R. 
Co., 36 Utah 238, 103 Pw. 243 (1909); In re Beason's 
Estate, 49 Utah 24, 161 Pac 678 (1916); and Upton v. 
Heiselt, 118 Utah 573, 223 P. 2d 428 (1950). 
The reasoning which supports such a rule was re-
viewed by Justice Wolf in Fisher v. Bank of Spanish 
Fork, 93 Utah 514, 74 P. 2d 659 (1937), as follows: 
"In passing, it may be pointed out that it 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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is the policy of the law to require parties to ex-
pose all their theories on which they base a claim 
or defense in the lower courts so that their ad-
versaries and the court may be appraised of 
them. A new theory raised for the first time in 
the appellate court as a basis to sustain a claim 
or defense will ordinarily not be considered." 74 
P. 2d at 660. 
Therefore, since appellant's equal protection theory 
was not presented to the lower court and was subse-
quently raised for the first time on this appeal, it must 
be disregarded by this court. 
POINT IV. 
APPELLANT'S CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
TO EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW 
ARE NOT VIOLATED BY THE SAVINGS 
CLAUSE OF THE UTAH CRIMINAL CODE. 
In the event that this Court elects to review the 
appellant's equal protection issue, the respondent has 
included the following argument which questions the 
actual merit of this issue. 
Appellant contends that the savings clause of the 
Utah Criminal Code, Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103(2) 
(1953), creates two classes of criminal defendants which 
are not treated alike. He alleges, that since the appellant 
is not afforded the benefit of the lesser penalty which 
is codified in the more recent criminal code, that he is 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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being unconstitutionally denied equal protection of the 
law. 
The facts associated with Point II of this brief dem-
onstrate that the appellant was convicted and sentenced 
prior to the time when the new criminal code took effect. 
Therefore, the case law of State v. Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 
490 P. 2d 334 (1971); Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 
380, 483 P. 2d 425 (1971); or State v. Miller, 24 Utah 
2d 1, 464 P. 2d 844 (1970), is not available to support 
has position. The court in Belt clearly holds that a legis-
lative decision to alter the penalty which will be imposed 
for a certain crime, does not raise a constitutional ques-
tion: 
"The power of the legislature to repeal or 
amend the penalty to be imposed for crime is 
not a matter of judicial concern. It is a part of 
the sovereign power of the state, and it is the 
exclusive right of the legislature to change or 
amend it; and if the amendment becomes effec-
tive before a final judgment of sentence is pro-
nounced, the amendment controls the punish-
ment to be meted out . . . If the state wishes to 
declare a lesser penalty for a crime, it may do 
so and no constitutional question would be in-
volved/' 25 Utah 2d at 381. 
It is evident that the legislature is granted plenary 
powers to alter the State's penal code. It is presumed 
that legislative decisions are founded on a rational basis. 
This Court in State v. Nielsen, 19 Utah 2d 66, 426 P. 2d 
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13 (1967), held that legislative measures should be in-
terpreted to satisfy constitutional standards: 
"The general rule of statutory ranstraction 
is to hold an emctment of the legislature valid 
unless it clearly appears to violate some pro-
vision of the constitution of this State or of the 
United States." 426 P. 2d at 15. 
In light of the aforementioned caset law, it appears 
that the savings clause of the new Utah Criminal Code 
is constitutional and that it does not deny the appellant 
of any of his cxwistitutioiial rights. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above stated, respondent respect-
fully submits that this Court should affirm the dismissal 
of the writ of habeas corpus by the Third District Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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